We propose a new primitive that could serve as a component in the design of block ciphers defined over a vector space of characteristic two. The primitive consists of squeezing a vectorial non-linear boolean function between two linear transformations. More precisely, the primitive transformation consists of a (linear compression) → (keyed nonlinear transformation) → (linear decompression) feed back with its input and then linearly transformed. We impose that the compression and decompression be perpendicular matrices for the system to be invertible even if the nonlinear part is not invertible. Our scheme has the practical advantage that many interesting properties of an entire round reduce only to those of the nonlinear transformation. As a matter of fact, we prove a lower bound on the minimal number of iterations, assuming independent keys uniformly distributed among iterations, to avoid paths both in the space of first order differences (differential cryptanalysis) as well as in the space of linear first order correlations (linear cryptanalysis) up to a desired threshold. We neither focus in this paper on the key scheduling algorithm nor on the nonlinear part and solely analyze how the linear components must be set up to be resilient against the aforementioned cryptanalytic attacks. Examples of our scheme are round functions of well-known block ciphers such as DES or IDEA-NXT based on the Lai-Massey scheme, families of block ciphers such as the original Feistel networks and generalized Feistel networks, as long as the underlying field has characteristic two and that no modular arithmetic is involved.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose a new family of symmetric cryptographic schemes based on vector spaces built over finite fields of characteristic two. A standard textbook on the subject is [9] , and we refer the readers to [11] for an exhaustive review of recent research in finite fields. Boolean functions for cryptography are discussed in [2] and [3] .
Every good symmetric scheme contains linear and nonlinear components. In this paper, we focus solely on the linear components of our scheme assuming certain properties of the nonlinear component. We indeed separate the linear and nonlinear parts. The nonlinear part could be for instance built from ideas in [4] . Our construction sandwiches the nonlinear transformation seen as a vectorial boolean function between two matrices. The latter matrices could be, for example, the generator matrix of a linear code, and its corresponding parity check matrix. We also do not focus on the key scheduling component as we simply assume identically, independently and uniformly distributed keys over the keyspace. By assuming i.i.d. keys, we do not indeed decrease the security since the entropy is higher than when keys are generated by a scheduler with dependency.
Section 2 introduces the scheme and the notation used in this paper. Section 3 contains three subsections, and each contains a result. Subsection 3.1 shows that squeezing a vectorial, and possible non-invertible, nonlinear transformation between two perpendicular matrices allows for invertibility of the whole system. The perpendicularity between two matrices here is the one induced by the vectors that make up the matrices, that is, two matrices are perpendicular if and only if every row of one matrix is perpendicular to any row of the other matrix. Subsection 3.2 contains a proof of reduction of the differential and linear cryptanalysis of one round of our scheme to the cryptanalytic knowledge of the nonlinear component. Subsection 3.3 contains the proof of lower bounds on the number of iterations to protect us from differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks. Section 4 contains some examples among which the Feistel family is shown to be part of our scheme, and some instance of the Lai-Massey scheme such as IDEA-NXT. In Section 5 we briefly extend our scheme to include the generalized Feistel networks as long as the choice of the underlying field is of characteristic two and does not involved modular arithmetic multiplications. Conclusions and further work are given in Section 6.
Notation and definitions
Let n > 0, N ≥ N i > 0, and N ≥ N o > 0 be integers, V = F n 2 , and consider the vectorial function F : V N → V N , introduced in this paper, given by
where 1. k ∈ K, and K is a vector space over F 2 , the keyspace with dim K ≥ N n,
T is an invertible matrix of size N × N over V ,
4.
A is a full rank matrix of size N i × N over V , 5. B is a full rank matrix of size N o × N over V , such that the following perpendicularity property holds:
Let us denote by I ℓ the ℓ × ℓ identity matrix with entries from F 2 . For instance, A can be the generator matrix of an (nN, nN i )-binary linear code written for simplicity in systematic form as [I nNi |M ] = A for some M , and B can be the parity check matrix [M t |I n(N −Ni) ] = B. Then, because the characteristic of the underlying field is two, AB t = 0. We briefly recall at the end of this section a few concepts on linear codes. We however do not need to restrict ourselves to matrices arising from binary linear coding theory, as suggested by Method 1 below. Now let us proceed with the following strictly positive quantities:
1. n as the word size, 2. N as the number of words, 3 . N i as the number of input words to f k , 4. N o as the number of output words to f k ,
5.
N Ni ∈ Q as the compression/contraction factor,
6.
N No ∈ Q as the decompression/expansion factor. We may sometimes omit explicit reference to the key and write F or f . For examples about how our scheme generalized other families of symmetric cryptographic scheme or particular block cipher instances, see Sections 4 and 5.
The following two definitions are for matrices (tables) that are central in differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, and for which we focus in this paper. We use d instead of n in Definitions 1 and 2 to avoid potential confusion with the rest of the text.
Definition 1 (Difference table-DT). Given a vectorial boolean function
we denote the entries of the difference table (hereafter DT) of g by δ g (u, v) where
where 1 denotes the indicator function.
Entries of a difference table are rational numbers between 0 and 1. The addition is modulo two taken component wise. For more information of differential cryptanalysis, see for instance [1, 5] . 
where · denotes the inner product.
Entries of a linear approximation table are rational numbers between −1 and 1 that represent correlation factors. As before, the addition is modulo two. The entries of a LAT of g are the Walsh-Hadamard coefficients of g. For more information on linear (correlation) cryptanalysis, see for instance [5, 14, 10, 12, 13] .
We point out that our scheme is very flexible. We show a simple method to generate perpendicular sets of vectors. Method 1. Given integers N i and N o , the following steps generate matrices A and B such that AB t = 0.
(1) Choose integers ℓ 1 > 0, and ℓ 2 > 0 such that N i ≤ 2 ℓ1 , and N o ≤ 2 ℓ2 . Let ℓ = ℓ 1 + ℓ 2 and let I = {1, . . . , ℓ} be the set of the first ℓ positive integers. For the remaining of this section, we recall some concepts and definitions from linear coding theory adapted for finite fields of characteristic 2. We also use a slightly different notation from the previous part of this section to avoid confusion. A binary (ℓ, k)-linear code is a k-dimensional subspace of the vector space F ℓ 2 . A generator matrix G is any k × ℓ matrix whose rows are a basis for the code, and therefore v is a codeword if and only if v = uG for some k-tuple u. A generator matrix is in systematic form if G = [I k | M ] for some k×(ℓ−k) matrix M . A parity-check matrix for a linear code is an (ℓ − k) × ℓ matrix H such that v is a codeword if and only if vH
is a parity-check matrix for the code. The dual code of an (ℓ, k)-linear code is the (ℓ, ℓ − k)-linear code whose generator matrix is a parity check matrix of the former code. The Hamming distance between two ℓ-tuples is the number of positions in which they differ. The minimum distance of a code is the smallest Hamming distance between distinct codewords. Now, let G be a k × ℓ matrix with entries in F 2 . Without loss of generality, assume ℓ > k and G has full rank. As proven in the subsequent sections, the reduction of the knowledge of the DT and LAT for F requires an ℓ × k matrix R such that GR = I k . We call such a matrix R, a right inverse of G. We also denote by 0 k the k × k zero square matrix. If G has indeed full rank, then, for some k × (ℓ − k) matrix U (where U may not be equal to M as before if G is not a generator matrix arising from a linear code), it can be reduced uniquely to
Remark 1. When designing F , we require to construct A and B with respective right inverses R A and R B , therefore allowing us to reduce the differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis of F to those of f as it becomes clear in the next section. We design F in such a way that R A and R B exist with their upper block (denoted by X just before) being equal to I k or equivalently their lower block (denoted by Y just before) being such that
We end this section with a remark that is not important for the rest of this research paper, but could be important in the design of block ciphers.
and V is a vector space of dimension n over F 2 . The matrices A and B can also be seen as matrices of dimension nN i × nN and nN o × nN , respectively. For any field F, we have that
The matrix A can be therefore the Kronecker product of a bit-level matrix and a vector-level matrix, and similarly for B.
Another approach in the design of A and B is to use a subfield expansion of linear codes. We recall some facts that by themselves explain the idea of subfield expansion of binary linear codes. If q = 2 n and B is a fixed basis of F q over F 2 , any element of F 2 can be represented by a row vector of length n over F 2 . We have an F 2 -vector space homomorphism given by B :
The multiplication by a fixed element b ∈ F q defines an F 2 -linear mapping that can be written as an n × n matrix M B (a) over 
Results
In this section, we first show that invertibility and perpendicularity are equivalent in our scheme. Second, we show how the analysis of the DT/LAT of F reduces to the one of f . Third, we show how to obtain lower bounds on the number of iterations of F to guard ourselves from differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks with a prescribed a priori desired threshold.
Invertibility is equivalent to perpendicularity
Lemma 1. The perpendicularity criterion is equivalent to the invertibility of F even though f may not be invertible.
Proof. Let y = F (x). From (1), we obtain T −1 y = x + B t f (Ax). Because AB t = 0, we have AT −1 y = Ax, and therefore
Let the inverse of the permutation F be G so that for x ∈ V N , and y = F (x),
Since the characteristic of the underlying field is two, using that AB t = 0, we have
Reducing the differential and linear cryptanalysis
We show here how one can find the differentials and the linear correlations of F using only those of f . In order word, the differential cryptanalysis and the linear cryptanalysis of F solely reduces to those of f . We use the fact that the matrices A and B are full rank, and have right inverses R A and R B of size N × N i and N × N o , respectively. More precisely, AR A is the identity matrix of size N i × N i over V , and BR B is the identity matrix of size
we recall Definitions (1), (2) , and get
In the following, we denote by rowsp(A) or rowsp(B) the rowspace of A or B, respectively. We observe that for the correlation coefficients λ f , there is no need to have N i and N o equal: v, f (x) ∈ V No and so their scalar product is an element of F 2 . Similarly, u, x ∈ V Ni , and so their scalar product is in F 2 . The sum of both scalar products u · x and v · f (x) is in F 2 . 
Theorem 1. Knowledge of the DT/LAT of f implies complete knowledge of the DT/LAT of F . We have that
where R A is the right inverse of A, that is, AR A is the identity matrix of size
Proof. By definition, we have that
which is equivalent to
Using the right inverse R B , the previous equation is equivalent to
and therefore
with a = Aα, and b = R t B α + T −1 β . Therefore, δ F (α, β) = 0 if and only if α + T −1 β ∈ rowsp(B) and δ f (a, b) = 0, and the result follows. For the Hadamard-Walsh coefficient λ F (α, β), we have by definition that
Thus,
Given u ∈ V Ni , let x = R A u, and
where a = R t A α + T t β , and b = BT t β. Finally,
otherwise.
We observe that in the proofs of the reductions we obtain two relations (one for the linear correlations and one for the differentials) that may be of independent interest:
where the latter expression comes from the linear correlation yielding a positive +1 value in the sum; the complement of the solution space yields those with correlation −1.
Lower bounds on the number of rounds
In this section, we provide two lower bounds: a differential cryptanalytic bound and a linear cryptanalytic bound. In both cases, in order to be interesting, the bounds must neither depend on the sequence of inputs and outputs nor on the round keys. In many models, we can choose the first and sometimes also the last state vector of the sequences. There are two sequences to be considered here. One random sequence involving states that we call differentials, and one sequence involving states that we call correlations. Each lower bound involves the same type of steps. The original input can be arbitrarily chosen. We assume the sequence of keys (round keys) to be uniformly, independently and identically distributed over the keyspace K. The first step is to find a condition to alleviate the dependence on the nonlinear term, where we recall that the nonlinear function involves round keys. The second step is to find a condition independent of the intermediate input or output such that the transition from one state to other state satisfies the intermediate linear equation using the fact that we operate in a field of characteristic two. The third step uses a fact about subadditivity of the codimension of subspaces in a vector space.
In what follows, we refer to ℓ as the number of iterations or rounds. Suppose that we are given an arbitrary input x ∈ V N and a sequence k ∈ K ℓ of ℓ independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) keys from the uniform distribution. We write k = (k 0 , . . . , k ℓ−1 ) ∈ K ℓ . The values of x and k uniquely define the sequence
where • denotes the usual composition of functions. For arbitrarily chosen α and, possibly arbitrarily chosen β, consider the random sequence (α i ) ℓ i=0 with α 0 = α, α ℓ = β and that satisfies for 0 ≤ i < ℓ either
Sequences satisfying (4) or (5) are obtained from the DT or LAT of F , respectively. One of our goals is to avoid with the highest possible probability the existence of sequences for which
Theorem 1 asserts that for all 0 ≤ i < ℓ, the values of δ
, respectively. We observe that Theorem 2 below is independent from Theorem 1. However, both theorems used in conjunction open the possibility for new cryptographic designs. In what follows, we make the assumption that for all k ′ ∈ K, there is δ such that max δ f k ′ = δ. Similarly, for all k ′ ∈ K, there is λ such that max |λ f k ′ | = λ. Such assumption is reasonably true when f k ′ (Ax) = g(Ax) + h(k ′ ) for some functions g and h with proper domain and image sets. Then for any ℓ > 0, we have
The function h can be an instance of a key scheduler algorithm. The right-hand sides of the previous inequalities can be further bounded from above if we obtain lower bounds for each instance of ℓ because 0 < δ < 1, 0 < λ < 1, given next.
Theorem 2 (Lower bound on the number of iterations). With the previous notation, let ℓ
Proof. Let (x) ℓ i=0 be a sequence with arbitrarily chosen starting value x 0 = x and with x i+1 = F ki • · · · • F k0 (x) for 0 ≤ i < ℓ. We consider the random sequence (α i ) ℓ i=0 , with arbitrarily chosen α 0 and, possibly arbitrarily chosen α ℓ which for any iteration 0 ≤ i < ℓ satisfies F ki (x i + α i ) + F ki (x i ) = α i+1 which is equivalent to
Any starting α = α 0 ∈ ker A satisfies the equation f k0 (Ax + Aα) + f k0 (Ax) = 0 no matter the choice of x. If the random behaviour of the process is such that it happens for all 0 ≤ i < ℓ that
and we therefore have for ℓ > ℓ d that 0
The matrix A is full rank so dim ker(A) = nN − nN i , and codim ker(A) = nN i . The subadditivity of codim for subspaces of a vector space implies that
We proceed similarly for the λ values assuming B is full rank. With the sequences (x i ) ℓ i=0 and (k i ) ℓ−1 i=0 , we consider the sequence of vectors (α i ) ℓ i=0 such that for 0 ≤ i < ℓ transitions from α i to α i+1 satisfy
t , then we are left with
then, for all 0 ≤ i < ℓ, the remaining condition
Let ℓ w be the smallest positive integer such that
The matrix B is full rank so dim ker(B) = nN − nN o , and codim ker(B) = nN o . The subadditivity of codim for subspaces of a vector space implies that
Now if we let ℓ * = max{ℓ d , ℓ w } and iterate a number of times ℓ ≥ ℓ ⋆ , then the result follows.
Examples
One goal of this research is to focus on the linear matrices of our new general scheme, and therefore, in the next examples, we do not explicitly recall the nonlinear parts. Existing schemes other than those mentioned in the following examples can also be found to be special case of our scheme. Example 1 shows how our scheme encapsulate the original family of Feistel block cipher. Example 2 shows a more specific instance which is the FOX block cipher. Example 3 shows what happens when the nonlinear part is made linear. 
Finally we have that
Another example is IDEA NXT that uses the Lai-Massey scheme [8] as a building primitive.
Example 2 (IDEA NXT-FOX). Here n = 16 or n = 32, and N = 4, The nonlinear keyed function f k : V 2 → V 2 is as given in [7] 
t and a round key k, one round of FOX is given by
Example 3 (Linear case). Suppose N i = N o = 1, and n = 2, then the only possible case for f k is the swap permutation xored to k. We have therefore
where
Since n = 2, we have here that V = F Then for a key k
Given a sequence of ℓ keys
k i ∈ F 2 2 for 0 ≤ i ≤ ℓ − 1, it is easy to find F k ℓ−1 • · · · • F k1 • F k0 (x) since F k ℓ−1 • · · · • F k0 (x) = C ℓ x + ℓ−1 i=0 C i Dk ℓ−1−i .
With two outputs
, we can learn x a + x b easily.
Embedding generalized Feistel networks
Hoang and Rogaway [6] consider several well-known types of generalized Feistel networks including: (a) unbalanced Feistel networks (in which we may have n = m for the n-bit to m-bit round functions), (b) alternating Feistel networks (in which round functions alternate between contraction and expansion), and (c) Type-1, Type-2, and Type-3 Feistel networks (in which the n-bit to n-bit round functions encipher (kn)-bit strings for k ≥ 2). We can reexpress all non-numeric generalized Feistel in our scheme, balanced or unbalanced. In Example 4 below, we show how to embed a generalized Feistel cipher of Type-1 constructed over F 2 . We suggest the reader uses [6, Figure 1] , where the designs of several generalized Feistel networks are given, as companion of the examples below.
Example 4 (A generalized Feistel of Type-1). We have V = F n 2 , I and 0 are respectively the n×n identity and zero matrices, the four-block input (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 , x 4 ) with x i ∈ V , and non-linear part f such that f : V → V . We note that in [6] , capital F denotes a smaller non-linear function which is denoted f by us. Then, the template matrices for one round of the Type-1 Feistel are reexpressed in our scheme as follows: From [6] , alternating Feistel and unbalanced Feistel can be also embedded in our scheme with minor changes. For alternating Feistel, we use two instances of A, B, T and f . Our scheme allows f to be non-invertible and hence include unbalanced Feistel.
It is interesting that Type-2 and Type-3 generalized Feistel networks do not fit in our model as presented so far. However, we can expand our scheme so to include such networks. For brevity, we show this only for Type-3 generalized Feistel networks; Type-2 can be easily derived by simplifying the Type-3 model. 
where x The results of Section 3 apply here almost immediately, including the reduction proof of the differential and linear cryptanalysis of one round of our scheme to the cryptanalytic knowledge of the nonlinear component, and invertibility of the system being equivalent to the perpendicularity of the matrices. We can, though, obtain a smaller lower bound on the number of iterations. Indeed, with a similar proof as before we obtain immediately the improved lower bound (compare with Theorem 2)
Conclusion and further work
We design a new block cipher scheme for which we prove resistance against differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks. Our scheme squeezes a nonlinear transformation between two perpendicular matrices, for instance the generator matrix of a linear code and its parity check matrix. This construction allows us to reduce the differential and linear cryptanalyses of an entire round function to the smaller nonlinear component only. Also we can show a lower bound on the number of iterations to prevent differential and linear cryptanalytic attacks up to a certain threshold. Further work include cataloging major past and current schemes that fit within our scheme. We also plan to study other properties such as those study in [4] , that is, the number of terms in the algebraic normal forms of the output bits, the algebraic degrees of the latter given the knowledge of those for the nonlinear component, and the cycle structure of one iteration or possibly many iterations assuming i.i.d. uniform keys. Other potential future work include the study of statistical properties proper to random walks arising from multiple iterations.
